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Virtue ethics was originally presented by its proponents as a rather special 
normative conception that was radically different from that of what was known as 
the ethics of duty.1 There were at least two important thematic lines behind this 
claim. The first concerned the way of delimiting the area of thought, behaviour 
and passions belonging to ethics2, while the second concerned questions connected 
with the nature of practical deliberation.3 
As regards the first aspect, those upholding virtue accused deontological ethics 
and utilitarianism of delimiting ethics to questions such as respect for other persons 
and their individual moral rights or the promotion of their happiness. In this 
description ethics is the combination of those institutions, rules and psychological 
dispositions that focus on how we should relate with others (with their freedoms, 
their goods, their desires) and does not directly concern the self, its needs and its 
development in its various dimensions. The proponents of virtue ethics have 
notably modified this way of delimiting the content of their area of enquiry. Ethics 
is that area of thought, behaviour and passions that concerns characters: that is to 
say, practical dispositions that involve passional and cognitive elements that 
arouse our approval and disapproval. A virtue is such, not only when it is the 
expression of our benevolent traits or those that inspire impartial behaviour, 
which are necessary for social cooperation, but also when it is the basis of those 
activities that mainly concern care of one’s self. The moral subject described by 
virtue ethics not only has benevolent traits or dispositions necessary for respecting 
the rules of group life, but also possesses other admirable qualities such as courage, 
                                           
1 For a discussion of this issue, see M. Slote, Virtue Ethics, in M. W. Baron, P. Pettit, M. Slote 
(eds.), Three Methods of Ethics, Oxford, Blackwell, 1997, pp. 175-238. See also M. Slote, Morals 
from Motives, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, ch. 1. 
2 See S. Van Hooft, Understanding Virtue Ethics, Chesham, Acumen, 2006, ch. 1.  
3 See S. Van Hooft, ch.1. See also D. Statman, Introduction to Virtue Ethics, in Statman (ed.), 
Virtue Ethics. A Critical Reader, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1997, pp. 2-41 and R. 
Crisp, M. Slote, Introduction a Virtue Ethics, in R. Crisp, M. Slote (eds.), Oxford-New York, 
Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 1-25. 
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prudence, steadfastness in achieving one’s goals, and the vocation to seek and 
follow one’s deepest impulses.4 
As regards the second aspect, those upholding the virtues claimed that these 
structural features modified the nature of the thinking that was in play in 
deliberative processes. It was a transition that was generally described as a change 
in the way of understanding the kind of practical questions that are at the centre 
of ethics, which is marked by the shift from the question “what should I do?” to 
“what kind of person do I want to be?” In this reconstruction virtue ethics put on 
one side what had been regarded as the perspective of modern philosophy that 
limited itself to actions and invited us to consider more complex practical problems 
as to the kind of life we should live. 
More recently, after the initial opposition between virtue ethics and 
deontological ethics and consequentialism, a new phase has begun, marked by a 
flowering of many different virtue ethics.5 Alongside new theories that offer to 
develop Aristotle’s moral philosophy we have seen various new currents that are 
working on theories of virtue elaborated in modern moral philosophy. In recent 
years, not only Aristotle, but also Hume, Kant, John Stuart Mill and Nietzsche 
have been the most frequent sources for conceptions of ethics that revolve around 
ideas of virtue and character. The interest in Kant’s Doctrine of Virtue, the 
development of a Kantian ethic of character and new positions on the role of the 
emotions in Aristotelian ethics have been the basis of recent attempts by Barbara 
Herman, Marcia Baron and Rosalind Hursthouse to show important areas of 
convergence between Kantian and Aristotelian ethics. 6  Other perspectives, 
however, have shunned Aristotle’s rationalist and eudaimonistic ethics. Julia 
Driver has expressed the need to reconcile recognition of the centrality of virtue 
with a perspective that reduces the importance of moral knowledge and that 
reconstructs moral value starting from the consequences of actions.7 More recently, 
Julia Annas has formulated a virtue ethics that starts from the Aristotelian thesis 
                                           
4 B. Williams, Morality. An Introduction to Ethics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1972, 
p. 79. 
5 For a systematic discussion of this new phase, J. Oakley, Varieties of Virtue Ethics, «Ratio», 9 
(1996), pp. 128-152; S. M. Gardiner, Introduction to Virtue Ethics, Old and New, in S. M. Gardiner 
(ed.), Ithaca-London, Cornell University Press, 2005, pp. 1-7. See also T. Chappell, Virtue Ethics 
in the Twentieth Century, in D. C. Russell, The Cambridge Companion to Virtue Ethics, Oxford-
New York, Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 149-171. 
6 See B. Herman, Making Room for Character, in S. Engstrom, J. Whiting (eds.), Aristotle, Kant, 
and the Stoics: Rethinking Happiness and Duty, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, 
reprinted in B. Herman, Moral Literacy, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press, 2007, pp. 
1-28; M. Baron, Kantian Ethics, in M. Baron, P. Pettit, M. Slote (eds.), Three Methods of Ethics 
Oxford, Blackwell, 1997, pp. 3-91; R. Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, Oxford-New York, Oxford 
University Press, 1999. 
7 J. Driver, Uneasy Virtue, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
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of virtue as a practical skill.8A virtue ethics that draws on David Hume informs 
the work of Michael Slote 9  and Lorraine Besser-Jones 10 . It is a particularly 
promising conception as it combines a pluralist and sentimentalist perspective on 
the virtues with a conception of human nature centred on sympathy and on the 
self-conscious emotion of pride.11 
The essays in this collection are an expression of this second happy phase of 
contemporary thinking on the virtues. Each of them has a clear philosophical 
perspective behind it. Yet they are not presenting an abstract defence of their 
orientation, but are seeking, rather, to defend it by showing how it is best fitted to 
respond to important aspects of our moral experience or able to provide a better 
explanation of some constituent principles of human psychology. 
Lorraine Besser-Jones examines how well eudaimonistic virtue ethics is 
holding up in the light of two recent objections: the self-effacing objection, which 
claims that virtue ethics is problematic because it sets out to justify the virtues in 
a way that is not part of the motives of those acting in favour of virtue, and the 
self-centeredness objection, which claims that virtue ethics, at least in its 
eudaimonistic version, expresses a selfish conception of ethics that does not take 
account of the other regarding passions that make up a central aspect of moral 
theory and of our shared ethical experience. Through an extensive discussion of 
the interdependent nature of the self, Besser-Joness shows how these objections are 
effective only in the false hypothesis that the self is egoistic. On the contrary, a 
virtue ethics that takes on board a relational conception of the self, supported, 
moreover, by influential research carried out by empirical psychology, can defend 
a version of eudemonics that is immune from these criticisms. 
The essays by Gopal Sreenivasan and Julia Driver both discuss the theme of 
moral deference. More precisely, they examine the situations in which a moral 
agent defers to a so-called moral expert in ways that leads us to consider him as an 
agent that falls short of our ideal of moral agency. Using various arguments, these 
essays show that though moral deference is a less than perfect outcome from the 
point of view of agency, this does not constitute a proof that the agent is not 
virtuous or, more precisely, that she does not possess that specific virtue on which 
she is asking advice of the expert. As Driver observes, what matters in these cases 
                                           
8 See J. Annas, Intelligent Virtue, Oxford – New York, Oxford University Press, 2011. 
9 M. Slote, The Ethics of Care and Empathy, London, Routledge, 2007and Moral Sentimentalism, 
Oxford – New York, Oxford University Press, 2009. 
10 L. Besser-Jones, Eudaimonic Ethics: The Philosophy and Psychology of Living Well, New York, 
Routledge, 2014. 
11See J. Taylor, Moral Sentiment and the Sources of Moral Identity, in C. Bagnoli (ed.), Morality 
and the Emotions, Oxford – New York, Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 257-274. See also D. 
Hart, M K. Matsuba, The Development of Pride and Moral Life, in J. L. Tracy, R. W. Robins, & 
J. P. Tangney (eds.), The Self-Conscious Emotions. Theory and Research, New York – London, 
The Guilford Press, 2007, pp. 114-133. 
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is that the agent is properly oriented in performing the action: that is, that the 
agent is responding to moral reasons although she may not be able to perceive 
them as such. The two essays, and particularly Sreenivasan’s, also show how 
virtue ethics, especially his version, which rejects the Aristotelian thesis of the 
unity of virtuous traits, has a greater chance of grasping this fundamental aspect 
of our everyday moral experience. 
The theme of the limits of moral understanding, considered in the framework 
of feminist ethics, is again present in Caterina Botti’s essay. Using a complex and 
eclectic method of enquiry, which draws on psychology as well as philosophy, 
Botti underlines that, though the relations between human beings are fact of 
human life that cannot be by-passed, they are marked by a constituent opacity. In 
her contribution, Botti explores the effects of this epistemological thesis on how to 
describe the virtues at the centre of the ethics of care. On the one hand, care 
cannot be based merely on the spontaneous exercise of compassionate inclinations, 
but will presuppose the cultivation of our imaginative resources, our receptiveness 
and out attention, which bring better understanding of the characteristic, 
distinctive aspects of specific care situations. On the other, Botti’s perspective 
brings out how the effort to understand others meets a limit, a threshold beyond 
which the other is not knowable. According to Botti, our willingness to care must 
therefore be associated with the virtue of humility, a trait that expresses our 
awareness that our cognitive resources are limited and imperfect. 
In continuity with his most recent works on care and moral sentimentalism, 
Michael Slote investigates the psychological causes of our altruistic inclinations. 
After distinguishing empathy – the psychological mechanism by which human 
beings and animals communicate their passions and opinions to each other – from 
sympathy, which is a term that identifies the active psychological principle that 
leads us to take care of others, Slote claims that there is a fundamental connection 
between these two psychological principles: empathy motivates sympathy. Slote’s 
enquiry offers to give a new and original explanation of this tie. Unlike 
psychologists such as Gregory Batson, Nancy Eisemberg and Martin Hoffman, 
Slote claims that the relation between empathy and sympathy/altruism is not an 
empirical, but a conceptual question. In this essay, Slote develops in particular 
Elizabeth Anscombe’s well-known thesis on the conditions of intelligibility of some 
desires. Following the structure of Anscombe’s argument, Slote claims that 
empathy constitutes a condition of intelligibility of our benevolent desires. Slote’s 
intention, with this explanation, is to provide an important argument in favour of 
a sentimentalist conception of the virtues. Slote shows that a perspective that 
appeals to David Hume’s teaching and that regards the mechanism of empathy as 
a constituent element of human nature can give a full account of that part of the 
virtues that coincides with the benevolent traits of character. 
Julia Annas and Sophie-Grace Chappell examine the continuing relevance of 
Aristolelian ethics. Annas discusses the inexplicably neglected topic of the nature 
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of vice, while Chappell deals with the question of the method, or methods, for 
determining the list of the virtues. 
In Annas’ contribution, an examination of our everyday moral experience 
reveals, in her view, the soundness of Aristotle’s analysis of this concept. Like 
virtue, vice too can be regarded as an internally unconflicted state of character. 
More precisely, just as the virtuous person, unlike the enkratic person, succeeds in 
doing the right thing without having to combat contrary motivation in order to do 
so, in the same way the vicious person is one who does not posses virtuous motives 
without feeling any regret for this lack. Secondly, Annas convincingly shows that 
vice, like virtue, is a psychological state that cannot be explained except as the 
result of a particular kind of upbringing. As a stable state of character, vice should 
be learnable in a way that virtue is learnable. According to Annas, the difference 
between these two states of character can be explained if we use the metaphor of a 
skill. Annas claims that every skill has its own intrinsic standard that concerns the 
acquisition of goods that are in some way intrinsic to that skill and that need to be 
pursued for themselves. Annas’ thesis is that though the vicious agent, unlike the 
virtuous one, can learn the skill, she will no longer be able to satisfy their 
standards. As she does not consider the goods internal to the skill to be pursued for 
their own sake, the vicious person merely acquires the skill because she considers it 
a means for pursuing other purposes. 
In her fascinating contribution, Chappell reflects on the methods for 
identifying the virtues within a certain community. Chappell is impatient with 
Foot’s ethical naturalism and, more generally, with every form of foundationalism 
that claims to derive admirable character traits starting from a morally neutral 
description of the excellent exercise of human faculties. Following this approach, 
Chappell proposes a cautious and piecemeal methodology that brings together 
three different suggestions: a non-finalistic conception of Aristoelian eudaimonistic 
ethics, McIntyre’s argument about the virtuous traits necessary for the successful 
pursuit of human practices, and the aesthetic and emulative value of the living 
exemplars of a given virtue. 
My aim was to assemble a cornucopia of varied current issues in virtue ethics. 
Yet, as is probably already evident from this preface, it is easy to identify some 
recurrent themes. For example, in their different ways the essays by Gopal 
Sreenivasan, Julia Driver and Caterina Botti all give attention to the issue of 
moral epistemology. Julia Annas and Sophie-Grace Chappell have a common 
interest in Aristotle’s legacy to contemporary virtue ethics. The notion of the 
social and empathic agent runs through the papers by Lorraine Besser-Jones and 
Michael Slote. And, taken as a whole, they show the endless fascination of virtue 
ethics. 
